EFEKTIVITAS POLA ALOKASI ANGGARAN TERHADAP KEMENANGAN INCUMBENT

Authors

  • Evita Ayu Komaladewi Suyoto Universitas Indonesia
  • Vid Adrison Departemen Ilmu Ekonomi, Universitas Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31092/jia.v4i2.1024

Keywords:

keuangan negara, ekonomi, kebijakan publik

Abstract

Soesilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) mencalonkan diri kembali pada Pemilihan Presiden tahun 2009 dan memperoleh suara yang signifikan sebesar 60,80%. Penelitian ini memberikan bukti baru dampak pola alokasi anggaran belanja Pemerintah terhadap keterpilihan kembali pada Pemilihan Umum selanjutnya. Menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dengan model regresi OLS, penelitian ini menganalisis data 440 Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan data hasil Pemilihan Umum dari Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) dan data Tugas Pembantuan (TP) dari Kementerian Keuangan untuk meneliti efektivitas pengeluaran belanja pemerintah terhadap perilaku pemilih di tingkat Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia pada Pemilihan Umum. Penelitian ini mengkonfirmasi bahwa pengeluaran belanja pemerintah dan hasil kinerja Presiden pada periode sebelumnya merupakan faktor yang mendukung kemenangan SBY sehingga terpilih kembali.

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Published

2020-12-11

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2020): NOVEMBER EDITION

Section

Articles

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